Even great leaders cannot craft a superb team if the membership is not up to the task. Membership selection is therefore a key event. There is no single metric that will allow a leader to select ideal team members, but a montage of metrics may well serve to do so [11]. Performance metrics that highlight dedication, drive, and aptitude are useful. Physical fitness assessment is another required element when selecting team members for high-speed team such as SWAT teams [12]. The Cooper Institute Fitness Assessment is a commonly used instrument that has been validated as a predictor of a police officer’s ability to complete patrol duties [13]. However, it is less rigorous than measures employed by US Military Special Operations Teams during member selection and performance review. The latter is a key element that is often overlooked, especially in low-activity (i.e., infrequent SWAT team callouts) regions with dually tasked individuals (patrol officer and SWAT operator, firefighter and urban search and rescue operator, etc.) [14]. Instead, iterative assessment is required for team membership. The military special operations teams have the benefit of continual assessment during deployments as well as between deployment training sessions. Indeed, fitness is part of the job description, and time is allotted for fitness maintenance; no such time is generally allotted for civilian special response team members, and such activities are generally not funded. Fitness is therefore the responsibility of the team leader and team members.

The notion of command overlaps with the concept of control. It is useful to distinguish the two as they are not necessarily embodied in the same individual. Command identifies that the individual can (by virtue of their position, power, and authority) compel compliance. Control implies that the individual is providing direction but cannot compel adherence to their plan. Control is enabled by persuasion, influence, and example. Both command and control are inextricably intertwined in critical incidents [1]. Indeed command is said to have delegated authority, while control is said to represent perceived authority. Military parlance denotes the two as C2. Team commanders may be selected on the basis of perceived or demonstrated skill in related or unrelated domains. Real-world experience (immersive, direct) is always preferable to tenure-based (inferred) experience [15, 16]. Commanders and team leaders need to maintain the initiative during critical incidents so as to direct the interrelated events necessary for resolution. This task is optimized by crafting an appropriate command and control architecture.

Since critical incidents are temporary, command and control architecture is similarly temporary. Embracing the need to have a single command entity, such temporary architecture should be explicitly constructed to be directed by a single entity. Such constructs may be typified by Emerging Multi-Organizational Networks (EMON) which consist of task-oriented and mission-specific collaborations of individuals and resources [17, 18]. EMON structure defines lines of authority (effectively but not necessarily equitably), distributes power, and efficiently allocates resources for critical incident resolution, broadly grouped into the following eight domains:

Communication systems pose a unique challenge to EMON structure as these events oftentimes involve disparate elements, integrating different communication systems and protocols. The most effective team is likely to fail if the parts are unable to communicate in a timely and effective fashion. One such example is the Area Command Team (ACT) concept of the LA County Sheriff’s office. Following the 1992 Los Angeles riots, the LA County Sheriff’s Department completed an in-depth review process that evaluated the logistics behind their successful and unsuccessful resource management that laid the foundation for modern management paradigms. The ACT concept has articulated structures that parallel how SWAT teams function today including a central command with linked field command coupled with teams with operational authority in response to conflict exigencies that depart from the anticipated course. Such a structure is readily adapted to nonpolice command team structures as well. Effective ACTs require resources to be funded and allocated for team use.

Resource management includes acquisition, cataloging, maintenance, revision, funding, allocation, mobilization, and deployment of needed elements in a fashion designed to swiftly resolve the critical incident. Therefore, resource management includes not only material but human resources as well. Since critical incidents often span more than one responder type (i.e., police, SWAT, EMS, fire), a system for resource management is essential. Resources can be housed at a single depot location or mobilized from various staging locations as needed. Both approaches work and selection of the most appropriate method should be influenced by local dynamics. An oft underappreciated aspect of resource management is team member development [9]. This includes ongoing training and advanced training of existing members as well as recruitment and education of new members. A plan for ongoing team development to include succession planning would also be appropriately housed under resource management. Regular review of all of the above elements helps teams and their administrators determine how best to manage all aspects of their teams.

Developing and maintaining a review process that evaluates team construction, resource allocation, and coordination within an agency as well as with other agencies should be distinct from the review process that evaluates team performance during critical incident deployment. The first relates to funding and the mechanics of relationship development, while the latter addresses real-world implementation of what the former has put in place. An essential element of the review process is to identify the presence of gaps in logistics for critical incident response and coordination. A templated approach to the review will support a regular process and should be constructed to identify elements that are missing and deficient in number or extent, as well as those that are ideal. Best practices that may be exported or taught to other agencies should be identified and should be considered for dissemination at multiple levels. Agency templates should have broad overlap of general domains (Fig. 27.2). The domains may include, but are not limited to:

The review process and logistical evaluation are thorough and redundant plan that optimizes strategy and resource allocation to ensure that all essential elements are available and accessible during critical incidents.

Transactive memory is a characteristic of successful teams that results from iterative training with the team as a whole [19]. Each team member understands their role as well as that of the other team members. Integrated training exploits the expertise of each team member and makes it clear to the other members of the team. An external reviewer might note smooth performance without significant need for communication to address challenges. Such observations characterize special operations teams that continually practice, train, and deploy together. Civilian teams rarely do so to such a degree, and many elements that are mobilized during a critical incident are accustomed to working alone rather than as part of a dynamic team (i.e., patrol officer who is the first responder to an active shooter scenario). Thus, the cultivation of transactive memory must be a fundamental goal of team training and may change throughout the life cycle of a team.

Teams are characterized by standard time frames during their lifespan (Fig. 27.3). Prior to the team’s creation, there is a perceived need for such a team that may be termed the “drive” for team creation. Indeed without such a need, the driving force for team assembly is notably less focused leading to a team that is diffuse in targeting and broad in scope. Lack of focus may compromise training and utilization leading to a team that is ill equipped to address the mission at hand. Once assembled, critical incident response teams “strive” to achieve a high level of performance that is task oriented and mission specific. It would not be appropriate for a SWAT team to prepare for firefighting, for example. Once assembled, trained, and deployed, teams “thrive” and refine their membership, skills, and capabilities. It is during this period that teams refine their mission. Some teams expand and others contract depending on local need and capability. Having done so, teams achieve a level of competency and may be characterized as having “arrived,” demonstrating organization that reflects a competency-based hierarchy. After a period of time and without a new drive, teams may atrophy, losing the crispness of their skills sets and decreasing the rate of new skill acquisition. Such events may reflect the aging of team members, lack of utilization as the original drive has been eliminated or decayed, or leadership failure as well as a host of other influences including deficient funding for training. Team salvage hinges on entering a phase of “revival,” relying on a new entry into the life cycle demonstrated in Fig. 27.3. Such driving forces often represent changes in the threat matrix or dynamic, changing environmental demographics, shifts in leadership priorities, or new team leadership or membership. One way to help support team dynamics is to evolve a stepwise plan for team management that addresses team building, performance, and debriefing (Fig. 27.4).