Chapter 12 Wildland Fires

Dangers and Survival

Martin E. Alexander, Robert W. Mutch, Kathleen Mary Davis, Colin M. Bucks

There can be few natural physical phenomena with the scope and complexity of a forest fire. The fuel that powers it is found in a huge range of sizes, quantities, and arrangements in space. The weather affects the current condition of this fuel array in a bewildering maze of drying and wetting effects, each fuel component responding to a “different drummer.” The combustion process itself, once under way, responds to a complex blend of fuel variation, moisture status, topography, wind speed, and other atmospheric factors. Its frontal intensity varies over an immense range, from tiny flickers easily stepped over, to dense sheets of flame whose fierce radiation keeps the observer at a distance.

—VAN WAGNER (1985)

For online-only figures, please go to www.expertconsult.com

In describing the 13 wildland firefighter fatalities that occurred on the Mann Gulch fire near Helena, Montana, on August 5, 1949, author Norman Maclean ²⁷⁵ wrote in his seminal book Young Men and Fire, published in 1992, that “They were still so young they hadn’t learned to count the odds and to sense they might owe the universe a tragedy.” Three years later, Canadian folksinger-songwriter James Keelaghan, inspired by Maclean’s book, paid tribute to the fallen firefighters in a haunting ballad entitled “Cold Missouri Waters.” The Mann Gulch fire has been called “the race that couldn’t be won.”⁴⁰³ Although the crew increased their pace ahead of the fire, the fire accelerated faster than they did until fire and people converged. Miraculously, three people survived the fire. Smoke jumper foreman Wag Dodge ignited an “escape fire” by burning off a patch of cured grass into which he tried to move all of his crew, whereas two others found a route to safety and escaped injury on a nearby rockslide.

Many improvements in a firefighter’s odds of surviving an entrapment or burnover encounter with a wildland fire have occurred since 1949. These advances include improved understanding of fire behavior, increased emphasis on fire safety and fire training, and development of personal protective equipment. However, as incidents such as the 14 firefighter fatalities on the 1994 South Canyon fire in Colorado (Figure 12-1) have shown, tragedies continue to occur.¹⁷⁰ Norman Maclean’s son, John, would in turn write about this fatal fire 50 years later.²⁷¹ Grief over lost loved ones can sometimes lead to further tragedies. For example, one of the smoke jumpers killed on the 1949 Mann Gulch fire, Stan Reba, had been married less than one year. His widow grieved for him and never remarried, and then 10 years later took her own life.^236,²⁸⁶

FIGURE 12-1 Flame front spreading upslope through Gambel oak (Quercus gambelii) and pinyon (Pinus edulis)–juniper (Juniperus monosperma) fuel complex during the major run of the South Canyon fire in western Colorado on the afternoon of July 6, 1994. Approximately two and a half minutes after this photograph was taken, the first of 14 firefighters was overtaken by the advancing flames that were estimated to have travelled upward of 110 to 165 m/min (360 to 540 ft/min).

(Courtesy USDA Forest Service; photo by S. Archuleta.)

Wildland fires are a threat to human life, property, and natural resources in many regions of the world (Figure 12-2). Although the total number of deaths among the general public due to wildland fires in modern times pales in comparison with the death toll and destruction from other natural hazards (e.g., hurricane, tornado, flood, earthquake, tsunami, avalanche)⁸³ and human-made disasters, the fatalities are frequent and devastating.⁴⁷⁰

FIGURE 12-2 A wildland–urban interface fire in the Amarante region of Portugal on August 5, 2005. Drought conditions contributed to an exceptionally severe fire season in southern Europe during 2005. Twelve firefighters and 10 civilians were killed in Portugal. Eleven firefighters were killed in one separate incident in a nature reserve in the Guadalajara area east of Madrid, Spain, on July 17, 2005.

(Courtesy Publico newspaper; photo by Paulo Ricca.)

There are very few comprehensive summaries of deaths due to wildland fires on a worldwide basis. The compilation of U.S. wildland firefighter fatalities begun in the early 1970s ⁵¹⁹ is unique.³³⁹ Statistics on the number of civilian or wildland firefighter fatalities due to being trapped or overrun by wildland fires on a global basis are unfortunately not kept in any systematic manner.²³⁴ It is, however, well known that more than 300 deaths due to bushfire entrapments and/or burnovers occurred in the state of Victoria in Australia alone during the 20th century.²⁴⁸ On Saturday, February 7, 2009, Australia experienced a bushfire disaster of unparalleled portions:⁴⁷³

In the wake of a long drought, and on a day of high temperatures, strong winds and low humidity, bushfires swept through residential and farming communities in Victoria. Some 430,000 hectares [one million acres] of forest and farmland, countless homes and other buildings were burnt, and hundreds of millions of dollars damage were done to economic and community assets. Far more tragically, it was Australia’s worst civil disaster: 173 lives were lost. February 7th 2009 has become Black Saturday, to be (one imagines) seared into the Australian psyche for generations to come.

That day, more than 300 fires were reported across the state. Fifteen of these developed into major incidents, with the most extensive damage and loss of life resulting from four fires.^138,^195,²⁹⁸ A royal commission was established soon afterward to investigate the causes and responses to these fires (http://www.royalcommission.vic.gov.au/). The commission’s final report, issued at the end of July 2010, sets out 67 recommendations for protecting human life, “designed to reflect the shared responsibility that governments, fire agencies, communities, and individuals have for minimizing the prospect of a tragedy of this scale ever happening again.”⁴⁵⁹ In their report, the commissioners offered a warning: It would be a mistake to treat Black Saturday as a ‘one-off’ event” for “ … the risks associated with bushfires are likely to increase.” Given the occurrence of other major wildland fire disasters involving significant loss of life in recent years—for example, Greece in August 2007^525,⁵²⁶and Russia during the 2010 summer fire season—this prediction has global application.

This chapter describes the current look at fire as a historical force and discusses fire management policies, the nature and scope of wildland fire hazards, behavior of fires, typical injuries, fatality fire statistics, several fatal fire incidents, and survival techniques. Although the emphasis is on North America, reference is made to other regions of the globe, most notably Australasia and Europe. Wildland fire, like many other disciplines and subjects, has its own unique terminology, so readers may need to consult glossaries.^190,^300,³⁴⁵

Wildland Fire Management and Technology

Programs for dealing with the overall spectrum of fire are collectively termed fire management.⁵⁵ They are based on the concept that fire and the complex interrelated factors that influence fire phenomena can and should be managed. The scientifically sound fire management programs that respond to the needs of people and natural environments must also maintain full respect for the power of fire.⁵⁵

Since the early 1900s, federal, state, and local fire protection agencies in the United States, for example, have routinely extinguished wildland fires to protect watershed, range, and timber values, as well as human lives and property. The basic methods of fire suppression ^210,²⁶⁸ have changed very little, although new technologies have gradually come on board (Figure 12-3). However, improvements in fire detection, fire danger rating systems, and fire suppression methods have been developed by fire science laboratories and two equipment development centers maintained by the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) Forest Service, as well other organizations (e.g., state agencies and universities). Patrol planes, some with infrared heat scanners, other fixed-wing aircraft (Figure 12-4), and helicopters (Figure 12-5), can deliver firefighters, equipment, and fire-retarding chemicals or water to the most remote fire. These firefighting resources are organized under an Incident Command System that can easily manage simple to complex operational, logistic, planning, and fiscal functions associated with wildfire suppression actions.^113,^184,³³² Many other countries have followed a somewhat similar path in their evolution with regard to wildland fire suppression and supporting research and development.³⁸²^–³⁸⁴ ³⁸⁷

FIGURE 12-3 A helitorch or flying drip torch is a specialized aerial ignition device slung below and activated from a helicopter (A). It dispenses and ignites gelled fuel. The use of a helitorch in wildfire suppression operations can take many forms (e.g., to reduce the intensity, slow, or steer a fire; to remove potentially dangerous fuel concentrations; to widen and strengthen control lines; to expedite mop-up operations). Regardless of its specific purpose, the main objective of this application of “fighting fire with fire” is to speed up or strengthen control actions (B). Aerial backfiring and burning out with a helitorch can be one of the safest, most economic, fastest, and least damaging means of widening control lines and constitutes one of the major innovations in wildland fire suppression technology in the past 30 years. The helitorch is also used in prescribed burning operations.

(Courtesy Alberta Sustainable Resource Development and Wildfire Consulting Ltd, Edmonton, Alberta; photos by O. Spencer and W. Bereska.)

FIGURE 12-4 Specialized fixed-wing aircraft like the amphibious CL-415 “superscooper” are capable of delivering water and chemical fire retardants on or near a wildfire. Although such planes are used in sustained-action situations on isolated sectors of large fires, they are most effective in initial attack operations during the incipient phase of fire growth. In such cases, their primary purpose is to slow down the progress of the fire until such time as ground suppression resources are able to arrive and effect direct containment. Wing-tip vortices are created in the wake of low-flying aircraft. These vortices gradually dissipate as they descend to the ground level. They can cause a sudden, unexpected increase in fire activity as a result of the momentary wind gust. This can pose a threat to anyone located near the fire perimeter.

(Photo by T. Nebbs.)

FIGURE 12-5 Several different sizes and models of rotary-wing aircraft or helicopters are used in a wide variety of direct roles as well as support functions in wildland fire suppression, including the dropping of water or fire-retarding chemicals directly on the fire. Helicopters also create wake vortices while in forward motion, just like airplanes, but generally these vortices are much weaker. A more common safety issue with helicopters is the downward induced air flow or rotary downwash. Some downwash effects are unavoidable when helicopters are engaged in direct attack on the fire with water or chemicals. Anyone located near the fire perimeter during such operations could be at risk. Even with a “long line” delivery system operated from a Bell 212 helicopter, as illustrated here on the Anarchist Mountain fire near Osoyoos in southern British Columbia on July 16, 2003, rotary downwash can still be a significant issue.

(Courtesy Alberta Sustainable Resource Development.)

Modern fire suppression technology, however, cannot indefinitely reduce the area burned by wildfires, as demonstrated, for example, by numerous large fires and major fire seasons in the past 30 years or so in North America: Mack Lake fire in Michigan in 1980; the “Siege of ’87” in California in 1987; Silver Complex in Oregon in 1987; Greater Yellowstone Area fires in 1988; Stanislaus Complex in California in 1989; Foothills fire near Boise, Idaho, in 1992; Garnet fire near Penticton, British Columbia, in 1994; Millers Reach fire in Alaska in 1996; Virginia Hills fire in Alberta in 1998; Florida fires of 1998; Silver Creek fire in British Columbia in 1998; Cerro Grande fire in New Mexico in 2000; Valley Complex in Montana in 2000; Chisholm fire in Alberta in 2001; Biscuit fire in Oregon in 2002; Hayman fire in Colorado in 2002; Rodeo/Chedeski fire in Arizona in 2002; House River fire in Alberta in 2003; “Firestorm 2003” season in British Columbia; and record-setting fire seasons in Alaska and the Yukon Territory in 2004 (Figure 12-6, online), to name a few. Similar incidents have occurred in other regions of the world. The hard lesson learned from these and other fires is that wildfires are inevitable. Several factors have coincided to produce massive forest mortality, including drought, epidemic levels of insects and diseases,^239,^319,³²⁴ and unnatural accumulations of fuels at the stand level and at a growing landscape scale in some but not necessarily all vegetation types²⁴¹ as a result of attempted fire exclusion.^16,²¹¹ This result in the dry forest types of the western United States was foreshadowed by a forester, Harold Weaver,⁴⁹⁹ in the early 1940s. Many agencies are now using prescribed fire more frequently, deliberately burning under predetermined conditions to reduce accumulations of fuels and to protect human life, property, and other values that are at risk by wildfire.^301,^320,³⁵⁴

FIGURE 12-6 Swan Lake fire in northern British Columbia (near the border with the Yukon Territory) during midafternoon on June 23, 2004. Such high-intensity fire events continue to spread until such time as burning conditions ameliorate, for example, when a change in weather conditions (e.g., winds die down) or fuel type (e.g., leafed-out hardwood stand) occurs, or a wide, natural barrier to fire spread is encountered (e.g., large lake or river). The natural fire regime in the boreal forest of Canada and neighboring Alaska is characterized by the periodic occurrence of large crown fires. In the Yukon, for example, the average area burned over the past 25 years has been about 120,000 hectares (about 297,000 acres) per year. During the 2004 fire season, a record-setting 1.7 million hectares (4.2 million acres) and 2.7 million hectares (6.7 million acres) were burned over in the Yukon and Alaska, respectively.

(Courtesy Yukon Government, Department of Energy, Mines, and Resources; photo by M. Clark.)

Research has indicated that fires are not categorically bad. In fact, many plant communities in North America are highly flammable during certain periods in their life cycles.⁸¹ For example, annual grasses, ponderosa pine, and chaparral plant communities are flammable during almost every dry season. Other communities, such as jack pine or lodgepole pine forests, although fire resistant during much of their life cycle, eventually become fire prone when killed by insects, diseases, and other natural causes. The spread of non-native grasses, such as cheatgrass and red brome, in the arid regions of the western United States has increased the frequency of fires in desert shrublands.⁵²⁹

Wildland fires can benefit plant and animal communities. Evolutionary development produces plant species well adapted to recurrent fires. Fire tends to recycle ecosystems and maintain diversity.^267,⁵²³ Thus, there is growing consensus that fire should be returned to many wildland ecosystems where appropriate to perpetuate desirable fire-adapted plant and animal communities and to reduce fuel accumulations.²⁴⁰

A landmark report in 1963 to the National Park Service by the Advisory Board on Wildlife Management ²⁵⁹ described how the western slope of the Sierra Nevada had been transformed by fire protection:

When the forty-niners poured over the Sierra Nevada into California, those that kept diaries spoke almost to a man of the wide-spaced columns of mature trees that grew on the lower western slope in gigantic magnificence. Today much of the west slope is a dog-hair thicket of young pines, white fir, incense-cedar, and mature brush—a direct function of overprotection from natural ground fires. Not only is this accumulation of fuel dangerous to the giant sequoias and other mature trees, but the animal life is meager, wildflowers are sparse, and, to some at least, the vegetative tangle is depressing, not uplifting.

It must also be acknowledged that in some cases, past logging practices contributed to the resulting fuel structure. Nevertheless, the board recommended that the Park Service recognize in management programs the importance of the natural role of fire in shaping plant communities.

Wildland Fire Management Policies

Recent tragedies in the western United States have focused attention on the need to reduce hazardous fuel accumulations.⁴⁴³ The events associated with the 1994 fire season in particular created a renewed awareness and concern among federal land management agencies about wildfire impacts, leading to a combined review of fire policies and programs. The result was enactment of a new interagency federal wildland fire management policy, which provided a common approach to wildland fire among federal agencies and called for close cooperation with tribal, state, and other jurisdictions.³³⁷ The principal points of the 1995 federal wildland fire policies are as follows:

• Firefighter and public safety remains the first priority in wildland fire management. Protection of natural and cultural resources and property is the second priority.

• Wildland fire, as a critical natural process, must be reintroduced into the ecosystem, accomplished across agency boundaries, and based on the best available science.

• Where wildland fire cannot be safely reintroduced because of hazardous fuel accumulations, pretreatment must be considered, particularly in the wildland–urban interface.

• Wildland fire management decisions and resource management decisions are connected and based on approved plans. Agencies must be able to choose from the full spectrum of actions—from prompt suppression to allowing fire to have an ecologic function.

• All aspects of wildland fire management will involve all partners and have compatible programs, activities, and processes.

• The role of federal agencies in the wildland–urban interface includes firefighting, hazardous fuel reduction, cooperative prevention and education, and technical assistance. Ultimately, the primary responsibility rests at the state and local levels.

• Structural fire protection in the wildland–urban interface is the responsibility of tribal, state, and local governments.

• Federal agencies must better educate internal and external audiences about how and why we use and manage wildland fire.

The 1995 U.S. federal wildland fire management policy was reviewed and updated in 2001,³⁴² following a particularly severe fire season in the western United States the year before; about 2.8 million hectares (about 7 million acres) were burned over by about 89,000 fires during the 2000 fire season in the United States.⁴⁷⁹ Results of the 2001 review and update were defined in the “2003 Interagency Strategy for the Implementation of Federal Fire Management Policy.”²⁵⁴ This strategy broadened the scope of fire management to balance fire suppression with management for ecologic benefits and supports the use of the full range of fire management activities to achieve ecosystem stability, including fire use. The 2003 implementation strategy stresses the need to complete or revise fire management plans that are more effectively and directly integrated with other natural resource goals.⁷⁸ One of the other outgrowths of the 2000 fire season was the National Fire Plan (http://www.fireplan.gov), which calls for the following actions:

• Ensuring that necessary firefighting resources and personnel are available to respond to wildland fires that threaten lives and property

• Conducting emergency stabilization and rehabilitation activities on landscapes and communities affected by wildland fire

• Reducing hazardous fuels (dry brush and trees that have accumulated and increase the likelihood of unusually large fires) in the country’s forests and rangelands

• Providing assistance to communities that have been or may be threatened by wildland fire

• Committing to the Wildland Fire Leadership Council, an interagency team created to set and maintain high standards for wildland fire management on public lands

It is clear from these objectives that one of the major foci of the U.S. National Fire Plan is the human dimension of wildfire (i.e., rural homeowners and communities).^235,²⁷⁰

The 2003 implementation strategy was reviewed during a field test in 2008 and resulted in a 2009 policy revision. The revision removed the distinction between wildland fire use and wildfire.²⁵⁴ It provides the highest degree of flexibility ever afforded to managers and facilitates their ability to respond to changing conditions and complexities of a wildfire event.

In 2005, the Canadian Council of Forest Ministers signed off on the Canadian Wildland Fire Strategy Declaration,¹⁰⁷ which is based on principles of risk management and hazard mitigation. This strategy will strive to strike a balance between public safety, forest protection and health, and fire management expenditures that maintains a strong and effective fire suppression organization, but it also includes innovative hazard mitigation, preparedness, and recovery programs—in other words, a more holistic view of wildland fire envisioned some 40 years ago as land management agencies made the transition from fire control to fire management. This strategy recognizes the need for shared responsibility among the various stakeholders (i.e., property owners, industries, and local, provincial, and federal governments).²³⁰ One of the guiding principles of this new declaration was that “public safety—including the safety of firefighters—is paramount.”

Fire management policies similar to those of the United States and Canada exist in other parts of the world.¹⁹¹ The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations¹⁹² prepared a generic set of fire management guidelines to serve as a basis for developing policies. The Fire Paradox project, a research initiative supported by the European Commission from 2006 to 2010 (http://www.fireparadox.com), examined wildland fire from multiple perspectives as a basis for influencing policies regarding integrated fire management.⁴²⁶

Prescribed Fire And Wildland Fire Use

Prescribed fire, the intentional ignition of grass, shrub, or forest fuels for specific purposes according to predetermined conditions, is a recognized land management practice.^35,^494,⁵⁰⁸ The objectives of such burning vary: to reduce fire hazards after logging, expose mineral soil for seedbeds, regulate insects and diseases, perpetuate natural ecosystems, and improve range forage and wildlife habitat.^307,⁵⁰⁰ In some areas managed by the National Park Service, USDA Forest Service, and Bureau of Land Management, naturally ignited fires may be allowed to burn according to approved prescriptions; fire management areas have been established in national parks and wildernesses from the Florida Everglades to the Sierra Nevada in California (Figure 12-7, online). Planned-ignition prescribed fires are also carried out. Similar policies exist in Canadian National Parks.²²⁴ Visitors are increasingly aware that wildland fires can be an important part of the natural cycle of an ecosystem and that the future health of parkland may depend in part on today’s managed fires.

FIGURE 12-7 Lightning-ignited fires in some wilderness areas and national parks in the United States that meet certain criteria have been allowed to burn freely under observation since the early 1970s as part of a fire management strategy to allow natural ecosystem processes to operate more freely.

(Courtesy USDA Forest Service.)

Wildland–Urban Interface: New Look of a Historical Problem

Just as resource agencies are attempting to provide a more natural role for fire in wildland ecosystems, the general public is increasingly living and seeking recreation in many of these areas. The area where houses and other human-made structures meet or are intermingled with wildland vegetation is regarded as the wildland–urban interface or intermix, although other names have been used (Figure 12-8, online). It is a growing problem from a wildland fire perspective in the United States^73,^391,⁴⁶⁷ and many other regions of the world.²²⁸ As mentioned earlier, past fire exclusion practices in the United States have allowed abnormal fuel accumulations in some forest types and regions, and this fact has combined with the sacrifice of relatively safe perimeter fire suppression strategies in favor of directly protecting people and their possessions.⁵¹⁸ Direct suppression actions within the fire’s perimeter place firefighters at a greater disadvantage from a safety standpoint. The new interagency policy that emphasizes firefighter and public safety as the first priority will result in less effort to save structures in dangerous situations. Thus, what is known of fire behavior and fire survival principles must be readily available to emergency medical personnel, wildland dwellers, and recreationists. In fact, fire protection agencies and others have been making such information more readily available to the general public for some time now,^114,^162,^193,⁵⁰¹ although much more needs to be done.¹⁷

FIGURE 12-8 Fire in the wildland–urban interface, or intermix. This particular wildfire occurrence took place on the outskirts of Kamloops, British Columbia, during the afternoon of July 26, 2007. The fire is spreading through ponderosa pine (Pinus ponderosa) in the “red attack” stage as a result of being killed by mountain pine beetle (Dendroctonus ponderosae) following attack one year earlier.

(Courtesy British Columbia Ministry of Forests and Range; photo by J. Hodge.)

Nature Of The Problem

Hot, dry, and windy conditions annually produce high-intensity fires that threaten or burn homes where wildland and urban areas converge (Box 12-1). Can the historical levels of destruction, injury, and fatality be repeated today in the face of modern fire suppression technology? The answer to this question requires an analysis of the conditions that created such high-intensity fire behavior events in the forests of northern Idaho and northwestern Montana during late August 1910 (Figure 12-9, online) in which 85 people (Figure 12-10), including 78 firefighters, were killed.^135,^179,^385,⁴³⁸

BOX 12-1

What Is It Like to Experience a Wildland–Urban Interface Fire? A Town That Nearly Went…Up in Smoke by D. Blasor-Bernhardt ⁶⁸

B12-1 Tok, Alaska, July 1, 1990, 15 to 30 minutes after the lightning strike that started the Tok fire.

(Photo by D. Blasor-Bernhardt.)

July 1, 1990, started out like any other Sunday, but it quickly turned Tok, Alaska, into a near raging inferno. I was working at the Chamber of Commerce Main Street Visitor Centre when an otherwise beautiful day suddenly turned black and foreboding. Blowing in, a huge thundercell hung just southeast of town.

I stepped outside just in time to see a long, crooked finger of electricity split from an ominous cloud and drill its way into Earth. Minutes later, where the lightning had hit, a mushroom-shaped cloud began to grow. I grabbed my camera and snapped a few shots.

Five days later, and in spite of several thousand firefighters and equipment from all over Alaska, Canada, and the States, Tok was completely under siege and at risk of being cremated. The wind-blown inferno licked greedily at several unoccupied dwellings, then consumed them. East-side residents were evacuated. We, on the west side, were told to pack our things, to be ready to leave, and to await further instructions.

Tok was enveloped on two sides by fire—from the eastern and northern directions. My log home was about a mile from the north front of the fire. I stood on the cabin’s sod roof, watching the fire, when the kids and extended family converged there about the same time, looking to me for instructions. All day, I had the sprinklers and hoses running full blast over the cabins, garage, and surrounding area. By now, the area looked like a swamp. Good. I’d leave them on, even if we evacuated, in the hope that it would help save some of our place from destruction.

Smoke stifled each breath. Helicopters screamed back and forth carrying people, equipment, and large buckets of water.

There was no fear, no panic, in anyone—just resignation. And there was no way our town would be destroyed.

I told the kids to first pack up whatever was closest to their hearts—it didn’t matter how silly an item seemed if that made them feel good. The first thing I placed in my own car was my late husband’s ashes. I couldn’t bear to leave him behind. Next, we would take irreplaceable things: photo albums, mementos. Then down to brass tacks: the necessary things for survival and rebuilding in the event we were burned out. Bombers loaded with retardant flew directly overhead. We were in a war zone—man against fire.

The girls loaded their cars with personal items. Mine was loaded with blankets, groceries, and clothing. The boys readied our tandem-axle trailer, loading it with items from the garage—chainsaws, tools, portable generator, water jugs. If the fire drew too near and we had to evacuate, the plan was for the girls and I to load our pets while the boys quickly cut the trees down around the cabins, hopefully providing a bare, wet perimeter between them and the fire.

Fully loaded, we assembled in the driveway, ready for word to come. Besides myself, six young adults, a baby, half a dozen dogs, numerous cats, a snake, six vehicles, and a trailer comprised the Bernhardt entourage. We were ready. We waited in the foul air, our eyes smarting from the smoke. An ember hit me on the shoulder, burning a hole though my shirt. Sadly, I turned to look at our homes one last time. Tomorrow they would be gone.

Imperceptibly at first, a slight shift in the wind began. I held my breath. “Mom?” my son said. “Yes,” I answered, “but I’m afraid to hope.” The wind, definitely shifting now, was no longer blowing toward us. A sweet, light rain began to fall. While the eight of us stood together, soaking wet in the rain, a trooper came by to tell us the worst was over.

In all, the fire burned 109,501 acres (44,314 hectares) at a cost of over $35 million (U.S.), yet not one person had been injured, not one occupied dwelling destroyed, and Tok had been spared by a miracle wind.

From Blasor-Bernhardt D: A town that nearly went … up in smoke, Guide to the Goldfields and Beyond (Harper Street Publishing, Dawson City, Yukon Territory) Summer: 52, 1997.

FIGURE 12-10 Burned ruins of the foundry in Wallace, Idaho, furnish mute testimony to the destructive force of the 1910 fires. The cottage on the terrace was the only one left standing in that part of town. Of the 85 people reported killed in the “big blowup of 1910,” 78 were firefighters.

(Courtesy USDA Forest Service; photo by R.H. McKay.)

FIGURE 12-9 These burned-over and wind-thrown trees resulted from the intense fire behavior associated with a forest fire near Falcon, Idaho, in August 1910.

(Courtesy USDA Forest Service; photo by J.B. Halm.)

The earliest fire incident of note involving a large loss of human life was the series of conflagrations in the Miramichi region of New Brunswick and adjacent areas in Maine in early October 1825, in which at least 160 people ^139,³⁷⁴ perished.⁴⁷¹ This was followed by several fatality fires in the U.S. Lake States region, including the Peshtigo and area fires in eastern Wisconsin in October 1871 (about 1300 fatalities),^227,^260,⁵¹⁰ the Lower Michigan fires of September 1881 (169 fatalities),²³² the Hinckley fire in east-central Minnesota in September 1894 (418 fatalities),²⁵² the Baudette fire in northern Minnesota in October 1910 (42 fatalities),³⁷⁴ and the Cloquet fire in Minnesota in October 1918 (538 fatalities).^108,²³² The western United States experienced other fatality fires, such as in western Washington and Oregon in mid-September 1902 (38 fatalities).^77,²⁹⁶ Canada suffered similar tragedies. For example, the province of Ontario experienced several significant settler-related wildfire fatalities in 1911, 1922, and 1938, including the 1916 “Matheson Holocaust” in which as many as 400 people were killed.^53,^159,²⁹⁵ In 1908, a forest fire destroyed the city of Fernie, British Columbia. Twenty-two people were reported killed.²⁷⁶

Other countries, such as New Zealand ²⁹⁹ and France,¹⁹³ are reported to have suffered similar but varying losses in the 20th century. In Australia, for example, possessing some of the world’s most fire-prone environments,¹¹⁵ 71 lives were lost in the state of Victoria on “Black Friday” in January 1939.^193,³⁵¹ On August 1, 1959, 48 people were reported killed by a forest fire northeast of Massif des Aures, Algeria.²³⁴ In early September 1963, forest fires swept about 2 million hectares (about 4.9 million acres) in Paraná State in southern Brazil, destroying more than 5000 homes and killing 110 people.⁴³⁴ More than 100 people were killed by extensive forest and savannah fires in Cote D’Ivoire (Republic of Ivory Coast) on the southern coast of western Africa during the 1982-1983 fire season.⁴¹⁵

On October 8, 1871, the same day that fire wiped out the town of Peshtigo, Wisconsin, and surrounding communities, the Great Chicago fire devastated urban Chicago.⁵¹⁰ Comparative statistics for those two fires highlight the destructive potential of wildland fires. In every way, the Peshtigo conflagration was far worse than the Chicago blaze. The Peshtigo fire covered about 518,000 hectares (about 1,280,000 acres) and killed about 1300 people, whereas 906 hectares (2240 acres) burned and some 200 lives were lost as a result of the Chicago fire.²¹⁷ The Great Chicago fire is generally acknowledged as the birthplace of modern urban fire prevention. As Lloyd²⁶⁵ notes, “mention the name Peshtigo to most people and all you get is a blank stare. Mention Mrs. O’Leary’s cow to the same person and they will think right away of the Great Chicago fire” and “Some of the same social misconceptions that allowed Peshtigo to be all but forgotten persist today.” So, it is perhaps fitting to consider the following poem entitled “The Peshtigo Calamity:”²³²

As the years roll along and the ages have sped

O’er the charred, blackened bones of the Peshtigo dead,

And the story is told by the pen of the sage,

In letters immortal on history’s page—

No fancy can compass the horror and fright

The anguish and woe of that terrible night.

The August 1910 wildfires in northern Idaho and Montana had several elements in common with the Peshtigo fires of 1871: many uncontrolled fires burning at one time; prolonged drought, high temperatures, and moderate to strong winds; and mixed conifer and hardwood fuels with slash from logging and land clearing. These large fires occurred primarily in conifer forests north of the 42nd meridian, or roughly across the northern quarter of the contiguous United States.⁷⁷ One of these critical elements that is not as likely to occur today as formerly is the simultaneous presence of many uncontrolled fires. The effectiveness of modern fire suppression organizations is now able to reach even the most remote wildland locations. High-velocity winds and more than 1600 individual fires contributed to the spread of the fires in 1910; it is unlikely that a multifire situation of that magnitude would occur today.^80,¹¹⁵ However, multiple fire starts are still possible owing to human-caused ignitions (e.g., arson, power lines). For example, on October 16, 1991, 92 separate fires occurred in the Spokane region of eastern Washington³²⁹ in the space of a few hours under the influence of exceedingly strong winds.³¹ Prolonged drought, high winds, and flammable fuel types, however, remain significant to the behavior of high-intensity fires.

Some of the fires most potentially damaging to human lives and property occur in areas rich in chaparral shrub fuel in southern California. Wilson ⁵¹⁸ and Phillips³⁷² described the severe 1970 fire season in California, in which official estimates showed that 97% of 1260 fires occurring between September 15 and November 15 were held to less than 121 hectares (300 acres). The other 3% of the fires, fueled by a prolonged drought and fanned by strong Santa Ana winds, produced 14 deaths, destroyed 885 homes, and burned about 243,000 hectares (about 600,000 acres), as chronicled in the 1971 film Countdown to Calamity. Ten years later, the situation recurred over 9550 hectares (23,600 acres) in southern California, the Panorama fire in November 1980, which resulted in the deaths of 4 people and loss of more than 325 structures.¹⁰⁴

On October 20, 1991, a devastating fire “of unprecedented force blew out of control”⁴ in the hills above Oakland and Berkeley, California. Burning embers carried by high winds from the perimeter of a small fire resulted in a major wildland–urban interface conflagration. The impact on people and their possessions was enormous.^4,⁴⁵³ The fire resulted in direct deaths of 25 people, including a police officer and a firefighter, injured 150 others, destroyed 2449 single-family dwellings and 437 apartment and condominium units, burned about 650 hectares (about 1600 acres), and did an estimated $1.5 billion in damage.³²⁸ The scenario for disaster included a 5-year drought that had dried out overgrown grass, shrubs, and trees, making them readily ignitable. Other factors included untreated wood shingles, unprotected wooden decks that projected out over steep terrain, low relative humidity, high temperatures, and strong winds that averaged 32 km/hr (20 mph) and gusted up to 56 to 80 km/hr (35 to 50 mph). The area had not experienced any rain for 67 days before the major fire run, although mean monthly maximum temperatures in the 6 months preceding the fire were not appreciably high (i.e., 18° to 23° C, or 64° to 73° F).³² These severe conditions produced a voracious fire that consumed 790 homes in the first hour. Winds lessened to 8 km/hr (5 mph) by the first evening, which assisted with the containment of the fire. Firefighters had the situation under control by the fourth day, but not before they had been given an awful glimpse of the nature of fires in the future. In late October 2003, fires in southern California burned over 300,000 hectares (742,000 acres) in 1 week alone, taking 23 lives and destroying more than 3300 homes.^103,^242,³²²

In recent times, wildland fire fatalities among the general public have not been restricted to just California, or the United States for that matter. Four civilians were killed as a result of the massive forest conflagration that converged on the outskirts of Canberra, Australia, in January 2003.³ During the summer of 2003 in Portugal, 21 people lost their lives in 18 different fire incidents.^488,⁴⁹³ On January 11, 2005, 9 people (including 4 children and 2 firefighters) perished on the Eyre Peninsula of South Australia as a result of being overrun by an extremely fast-spreading grass fire in what is now referred to as “Black Tuesday” in the state.^125,^430,⁴³⁷ Mutch and Keller³²³ give a compelling account of the wildfires that occurred in Texas and Oklahoma during late 2005 and the early part of 2006, in which 19 civilians and 6 firefighters lost their lives.

In many parts of the world, but especially in the United States and Canada, the primary response has been to evacuate all people threatened by wildfires.^1,^136,³⁹⁰ For example, more than 200,000 people were evacuated in Canada between 1980 and 2007 in more than 500 separate incidents⁶⁷ The pros and cons of evacuation are extensively discussed in Chapter 12 of Webster’s seminal work,⁵⁰¹ The Complete Bushfire Saftey Book, entitled “The Decision—Evacuate or Stay? Safety or Suicide?” In this regard, Phil Cheney,¹¹⁹ a renowned Australian bushfire research scientist, feels that “What it comes down to is a civil right to risk your own life to save your house. I personally am in favor of people taking risks in their lives provided that they also bear the responsibility for the consequences.”

Some amazing logistic feats have taken place to date without incident using both ground and air transportation. A good example of the latter occurred in early June 1995 as the residents of Fort Norman and Norman Wells in Canada’s Northwest Territories were airlifted to Yellowknife, the territorial capital.¹⁶⁰ However, statements later on from the public like “I think they took us away just in time” suggest that this approach is not infinitely infallible. Coupled with this reality is the fact that modern fire records indicate that the vast majority of area burned by wildfires is the result of a small percentage of fires.⁴⁴⁶ Thus, on some days, adverse fuel and weather conditions, coupled with an ignition source, will conspire to produce conflagrations that occur in spite of our best fire prevention, detection, and initial attack efforts. Climate change will only exacerbate the situation.¹⁸⁸ Recent research involving simulations of evacuations in response to a threatening wildfire has revealed that strategic planning is essential.¹⁵²^–¹⁵⁴ ¹⁶³ Communities need to ensure that they are fully prepared well in advance of a threatening wildfire occurrence by developing individual and local government emergency action plans.³⁶⁴ Taylor⁴⁵⁵ has emphasized that managing the fire risk at the wildland–urban interface is a shared responsibility involving both private citizens and numerous government agencies.

Past fire experiences in Australia ^360,⁵⁰¹ have demonstrated that quite often “houses protect people and people protect houses.” Research had demonstrated that a well-prepared house can provide protection from fire and that the presence of people prepared to defend against their home burning down is the most significant factor in determining its survival (Table 12-1). Obviously, zones of defendable space around homes must be established in advance of fires; the young, older adults, and infirm are generally encouraged to leave well ahead of the fire. Communities at risk from wildfires should be encouraged to be responsible for their own safety, because fire service personnel may not be available when burning conditions are severe. The major issue is whether able-bodied residents should stay and defend or “fight” for their homes, or “flee” in the hopes of escaping an advancing fire.⁵¹⁶

TABLE 12-1 Approximate Probabilities of a House Surviving a Wildland Fire*

In the late 1990s, the Tasmania Fire Service had a policy that provided guidance on bushfire safety and evacuation decision making called “Prepare, Stay, and Survive.”²⁰⁵ When there was a threatening wildfire, people were told to go home and assist in the protection of their property. Because human lives and property values are at risk when threatened by wildfires, exemplary cooperation and teamwork are required to ensure adequate safety margins. Team members identified for reducing the loss of life and property include state agencies, local government, the communities, and individuals.

The “Stay or Go” policy concerning evacuation was advocated by the Australasian Fire Authorities Council (AFAC)⁴⁵ as a fundamental component of community bushfire safety in Australia.²²² Variants to this general theme exist (e.g., “prepare, leave early, or stay and defend”). However, the essence of the approach urges people to make the decision to prepare themselves and their properties to “stay” and defend when a wildfire is likely, or to “go” well before a fire is likely to arrive. Although early evacuation may contribute to increased personal safety, bushfire property losses are likely to increase. Conversely, late evacuation may put people at greater risk than had they stayed in the house as the fire passed around them.

An evaluation of this policy is the focus of Project C 6—Evaluation of Stay or Go Policy currently being undertaken by the Australian Bushfire Cooperative Research Centre (http://www.bushfirecrc.com/research/c61/c61.html), led by co–project leaders John Handmer, RMIT University, and Alan Rhodes, Country Fire Authority of Victoria. Fire management agencies and the public alike will no doubt find the final results of this research project of great interest. Preliminary results emerging from the project generally supported the 2005 AFAC position, while recognizing that implementation issues remained.* However, the fires of February 7, 2009, in Victoria, Australia, and in turn the Royal Commission’s report⁴⁵⁹ have changed the context for this approach quite significantly. There are a number of emerging issues (e.g., limit of validity), so the policy is most likely to evolve in coming years³⁹⁹in the aftermath of the Black Saturday fires, as evidenced by AFAC’s revised position on bushfire community safety based on emergency risk management principles.⁴⁹

The 2009 Black Saturday fires have placed an urgent emphasis on the continuing debate over what constitutes the safest strategies for survival in the wildland–urban interface. The Victorian fires led to the creation of a catastrophic, or “Code Red,” level of fire danger. When this category of fire danger is forecast for the next day, it is recommended that people in a high-risk bushfire area leave the night before or in the early morning (http://www.cfa.vic.gov.au/firesafety/bushfire/danger-warnings.htm). At the next two lower levels (i.e., “Extreme” and “Severe”), it is recommended to stay only if one’s home is well prepared, well constructed, and can be actively defended.

Testimony by John Handmer before the 2009 Victorian Bushfires Royal Commission,⁴⁵⁹ coupled with analyses produced by him and his research team,²²⁰ indicate that only a small percentage of homes and property were adequately prepared to be fire resistant. Without preparing a fire-resistant home and property in advance, the only prudent course of action is to evacuate early.

This issue of whether to “prepare, stay, and defend” or evacuate early is a subject considered worthy of more open debate and discussion in North America.^17,^294,^325,^365,⁴⁴² Two communities in the United States—Painted Rocks in Montana and Rancho Sante Fe in California—have adopted variations of the original Australian model of “Prepare, Go Early or Stay and Defend.”³²⁵ Both communities have had the “Stay and Defend” practice successfully tested by wildfires. Both U.S. communities are carefully monitoring the lessons learned from the 2009 Black Saturday fires to determine if any change is needed in their approach. Meanwhile, Ready, Set, Go! (RSG) was rolled out as a full-scale pilot program by the Ventura County Fire Department and the Orange County Fire Authority for the 2009 fire season in Southern California. Other fire departments, such as Los Angeles County,¹⁵¹ Los Angeles City, San Bernardino County, Riverside County, Santa Barbara County, and Cal Fire, have adopted the basic approach. The RSG approach involves preparing one’s house to withstand a wildfire, preparing one’s family for evacuation, and finally, leaving earlier. The program is now endorsed by the International Association of Fire Chiefs (http://www.iafc.org/displaycommon.cfm?an=1&subarticlenbr=1229).

In many regions of the world, people are warned that wildfires are dangerous and that they always need to evacuate. This scare tactic approach reinforces the concepts that wildland fires are always dangerous and that people must leave their homes. Perhaps one solution to dealing with fires in the wildland–urban interface in the future would be to embrace the concept of “A Dream, a Team, and a Theme.”³²¹ The “dream” would be one where houses are able to survive fires even when fire services personnel are not available. The “team” would consist of the effective partnership between the fire services and home dwellers. The “theme” would comprise the dual strategy of adequate defensible space coupled with the home dweller’s motivation to remain on site as an important factor in suppressing fires initiated by ember attack. In order for this approach to work, rural homeowners must understand that although wildfires can be dangerous, with proper precautions, people can remain with their homes and be an important part of the solution to the wildland–urban interface fire problem. Empowering communities at risk from wildfire to play an active part in their own protection is viewed as a viable long-term strategy to enable safe and harmonious coexistence with fire as an element of nature.¹¹⁷

During the 2000 fire season in western Montana, some individuals took it upon themselves to stay with their homes as flame fronts advanced. They created defensible space, installed sprinkler systems, engaged in fire suppression activities, and provided local intelligence to incoming fire service personnel. No home was lost as people demonstrated responsibility for their personal well-being. A similar “prepare, stay, and defend” action was successfully carried out during the 2003 fire season on the Wedge fire along the North Fork of the Flathead River in western Montana. The property was prepared in advance to be “fire safe,” the homeowner remained with volunteer fire department officials, and the home survived the passage of a high-intensity crown fire (Figure 12-11).

FIGURE 12-11 Homeowners and firefighters (A) successfully prepared, stayed, and defended this rural home in western Montana from a high-intensity flame front (B) associated with the Wedge fire in July 2003.

(Courtesy Big Fork Volunteer Fire Department.)

Wildland fires that threaten human lives and property are not exclusively located in southern California because the exodus to wildland regions has become a national phenomenon. Fires burned about 81,000 hectares (about 200,000 acres) in Maine in October 1947, killing 16 people;^100,¹⁷² another area of about 81,000 hectares (about 200,000 acres) burned in New Jersey in April 1963.⁵² Wildland fire disasters have not always been large in size. On September 26, 1936, most of the coastal town of Bandon in western Oregon was destroyed, and 11 people were killed by a wildfire that covered probably no more than about 4000 hectares (about 10,000 acres).²³² The prevalence of gorse (Figure 12-12), a non-native plant, was considered a key contributing factor to the resulting devastation. More recently, on July 16, 1977, the Pattee Canyon fire in Missoula, Montana, destroyed 6 homes and charred about 500 hectares (about 1200 acres) of forests and grasslands in only a few hours.¹⁸⁷ Similarly, more than 70 homes were damaged or destroyed by fires in the southern Cape Peninsula region of South Africa that burned about 8000 hectares (about 19,800 acres), during January 16 to 20, 2001.^105,⁴⁸⁶ A whole host of other cases have occurred in North America²³¹ and are steadily accumulating.