Victim Rescue

The first challenge to OPSEC and site security is victim rescue in the immediate aftermath of an incident. This is the initial and most dramatic problem faced by all responders during and immediately after a terrorist attack or large-scale event. A driving characteristic common to most responders is the natural instinct to rush forward, nobly intentioned, to do whatever one can to quickly save as many lives as possible. However, for both the safety of the responders and the victims, as well as the sustained good of the mission, some deliberate restraint and organization must be exercised. Absent this disciplined wisdom, the overall incident management may be negatively affected, and people may die needlessly. Among the lasting images from the events of 9/11 and the Boston Marathon attack are the hundreds of first-responder personnel rushing to the scene to help all who were impacted by these horrible attacks. The counterpoint is the striking example of misguided good intentions observed at the Shanksville, Pennsylvania, United Airlines flight 93 crash site, which on September 11, 2001, became overwhelmed and severely congested because of both on- and off-duty units responding, making their way to the scene either by self-dispatch or by convincing dispatchers to send more help. The resulting chaos clogged the scene, severely complicating command and control, and confusing perimeter maintenance.

This area of OPSEC and site security primarily deals with ensuring an effective response rather than an unorganized, potentially dangerous, and surely less-effective response. Implementation of IMS/UCS could have diminished the reported congestion because it states that off-duty response personnel should not respond to an event unless directed to do so. Although operational doctrine dictates that you “man your post” until otherwise directed, the reality is that such a situation rarely exists.

The instinct to respond is powerful and is complicated by the “touch the plane” phenomenon, in which people feel they have to be at the disaster scene so they can tell anyone who will listen that they were indeed there “when it happened.” Therefore it is incumbent on the agency and organizational leaders to stress and practice operational discipline that demands coordination and adherence to strict deployment protocol. Another relevant example is provided by the Bali Bombing of October 2002. As with other examples, the Bali responders rushed in to help victims, with the intention to save as many lives as possible, and, in doing so, rendered OPSEC and site security nonexistent, and it placed many more lives in danger in the event of another coordinated secondary attack. Even though it is difficult to find fault with the selfless actions of such responders, it is, however, crucial that this emotional response be tempered by reason and the knowledge that restraint and discipline are essential. They are necessary for a measured and effective response, in addition to ensuring an effective investigation to bring the perpetrators to justice.

Finally, there is the example of the brave responders to the World Trade Center attacks. In their zeal to charge into the scene and save as many people as possible, the “tunnel vision“ they experienced allowed them to neglect properly assessing the danger to their own lives. Based upon this historical experience, responders must consider the full gamut of threats posed by formal secondary attacks or secondary effects of the primary attack mindfully. This includes the possibility that the initial event is actually a precursor to a campaign of attacks, as well as the expanded implications of fire, hazardous materials, and associated infrastructure failures. Any one of these elements presents daunting challenges for a responder, and the collective effects of multiple known and unknown operational variables further complicate the response exponentially. The potential confluence of events compounds the threats to environmental safety, and demands that the responsible emergency-response chief establishes and maintains aggressive safety policies throughout the event.

OPSEC and site security involve understanding the situation as accurately possible, including the possibility that attempting to rescue victims immediately may not be the wisest, safest, or most appropriate course of action. Although it may seem that delaying rescue efforts is tantamount to abandonment of our duty to act and is contrary to the oath many of us swear to, in the end, lives may be saved by taking the time to assess the situation fully, in a coherent fashion, before executing operational response.

Personnel Needs

The security needs of response personnel are a major issue to be addressed when planning a response to a high-impact and high-yield emergency incident. These needs are varied and can be very complex, complicated, and resource intensive, particularly during and after a terrorist event. These demands are further increased given the likelihood of hazardous materials being present, and the intent of the terrorist to hurt or kill as many people as possible, including responders.

One very good example of this occurred during the 1997 Tokyo Sarin attacks in the subway. Japanese medical personnel lacked proper PPE; more than 20% of the staff of St. Luke’s International Hospital exhibited detrimental physical effects after treating victims of the attack. Had the hospital planned properly and equipped the facility and personnel, in addition to regularly training all employees, the instances of secondary contamination may have been greatly reduced once a nerve-agent attack was recognized.

Another well-known example of responders lacking proper PPE was the September 11, 2001, attacks. Early in the response, heavy particulate asbestos was found at the site, and later, Freon, cadmium, and other hazardous materials were identified, yet there were many personnel operating without proper protective equipment. This can be attributed to poor planning, poor operational discipline, and/or lack of threat awareness. Logistics-acquisition problems also contributed because there was simply not enough equipment to go around. This suggests that planners failed to conceive or believe that an attack of this scale could possibly occur. Poor logistics further contributed because the equipment that was present was not distributed properly.

Another critical aspect of protecting responders in a traditional sense involves personnel rest and rehabilitation, which are critical to the success and sustainability of an operation. Although rescuers are often willing to work to the point of exhaustion, this is dangerous to the responders, the victims, and the effectiveness of an operation. Fatigue creates more casualties through impaired decision making, increased stress and frustration, and impaired judgment. The medical profession continues to address the effects of sleep deprivation and fatigue, because of errors directly traceable to exhausted health care providers. Several well-publicized studies chronicling the effects of long work hours in life-and-death stressful environments reveal that errors have produced increased morbidity and mortality in the patients being cared for by these well-meaning professionals. Studies conducted over the last several years reveal that moderate sleep deprivation produces impairments in cognitive and motor performance equivalent to legally prescribed levels of alcohol intoxication.

To help ensure safe and effective sustained operations, IMS/UCS empowers the Incident Commander to plan for sustained operations by dividing the available workforce across shifts. Work-rest cycles are implemented, and shift durations deliberately established, allowing for the necessary rest and rotation of personnel, even if it must be mandated. The final strategic and operational concern addressed in this chapter is the continuation of public services, including EMS, medical, law enforcement, and fire service, through the end of the incident and into the recovery stage. Sustaining 911-response capacity for an entire community should be a necessary goal that agencies and first responders must accept and embrace. Just because one is being confronted with a large disaster in one’s community does not alleviate the obligation to ensure that “all” emergencies in the community are managed appropriately.

Clearly, and especially in the case of EMS, the fiscal implications of having a sustainable and robust response system that can handle any and all 911 calls at all times is strictly prohibitive. Burden sharing has become accepted widely by way of mutual aid compacts between communities, regions, and now states under the Emergency Management Assistance Compact. The key to successful sustained operation is embracing this concept and employing it, as required, on a regular basis. Further, reviewing scene-safety response protocols for commonality, ensuring interoperability, and having a shared vision of OPSEC and site-security tactics are integral during the duress of a real event.

Hospitals share the same concerns for their facilities and staff. During the planning phase for disaster response, hospital planners must consider a number of issues that previously did not require their attention. Such matters include increased security, physical management of patient flow, PPR, decontamination strategies, and staff training and support. One hospital failure that drew much national media attention occurred in Florida during the hurricane season of 2004. Florida Hospital Ormond Memorial fired and/or suspended more than 20 nurses for not working during Hurricane Frances. The nurses were fired for not calling in, not showing up, or refusing to work, whereas others were suspended for not completing a shift. The hospital stated that hospital policy required critical care employees to work during a disaster. In media accounts, some nurses alleged that they were not trained to deal with these extreme scenarios, and they questioned who would protect their families. Nevertheless, in a crisis, staffing rosters based on the internal disaster plan were not followed, leaving the facility poorly positioned to cover staff vacancies and sustain operations.

Another unfortunate occurrence in the aftermath of disasters is the potential for civil unrest and criminal activity. Police resources are often allocated elsewhere, concentrated at the site of the disaster. Coverage is degraded in the areas where law enforcement officers would normally patrol or deploy, and if the presence is weakened enough, citizens may loot nearby houses, commercial districts, and in some cases emergency-response equipment. Examples of this can be found in the history of countless disasters, including the looting after Hurricane Sandy in 2012, Hurricane Charley’s August 2004 landfall in Florida, the events in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina 2005, as well as the unsubstantiated accusations of looting by the responders themselves following the 9/11 attacks on New York City.

Community planners, responders, and emergency services personnel must also consider the potential for events to have rendered a large-scale area too dangerous even for emergency responders to enter. Such examples might include significant hazardous materials release or large radiological incidents. Responders must ask themselves two questions and answer them honestly: (1) In such a situation, what are the primary responsibilities of responders in getting people out, keeping people from entering, and making sure that the area remains contained? (2) Are the responders prepared to evacuate, relocate, secure, and effectively close a significant portion or an entire city, as was necessary during the Chernobyl disaster?

Proper and effective deployment of law enforcement officers is a key aspect of the incident management, NIMS, and NRF. Successful integration of law enforcement partners firmly within the Unified Command framework promotes effective coordination among responders of different disciplines. It affords greater cohesiveness and security for all personnel operating on site. Moreover, it facilitates integrated operations and the investigative process and provides for sustained reliable evidence collection. Similar concerns exist for fire services in the wake of a disaster, particularly in fire-heavy disasters. The standard fire service response is to rush to the scene of a major working fire and engage to control the threat and resolve the problem rapidly. This traditional response strategy was illustrated in the 2001 World Trade Center response. One can imagine the collateral dangers if concurrent fires were to emerge in other parts of the city, particularly in the event of a secondary terrorist attack. The effectiveness and value of mutual aid are clearly apparent in the responses to any number of large-scale disasters, but this was particularly evident on September 11, 2001. There is also precedent for terrorists using fire as a weapon to drive victims from positions of security or to hamper the emergency response.